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ABSTRACT
Carbon sequestration in community forests presents a major challenge for the
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
programme. This article uses a comparative analysis of the agricultural and
forestry practices of indigenous peoples and settlers in the Bolivian Amazon
to show how community-level institutions regulate the trade-offs between
community livelihoods, forest species diversity, and carbon sequestration.
The authors argue that REDD+ implementation in such areas runs the risk
of: 1) reinforcing economic inequalities based on previous and potential
land use impacts on ecosystems (baseline), depending on the socio-cultural
groups targeted; 2) increasing pressure on land used for food production,
possibly reducing food security and redirecting labour towards scarce off-
farm income opportunities; 3) increasing dependence on external funding
and carbon market fluctuations instead of local production strategies; and
4) further incentivising the privatization and commodification of land to
avoid transaction costs associated with collective property rights. The article
also advises against taking a strictly economic, market-based approach to
carbon sequestration, arguing that such an approach could endanger fragile
socio-ecological systems. REDD+ schemes should directly support existing
efforts towards forest sustainability rather than simply compensating local
land users for avoiding deforestation and forest degradation.
INTRODUCTION
To many scholars and policy makers, REDD+ is more than just a pro-
gramme for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
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REDD+ is seen as a unique worldwide opportunity for obtaining fresh fi-
nancial and technical support for more sustainable management of forests by
local communities (Eliasch, 2008). However, the ways in which REDD+ is
generally implemented are increasingly being called into question (McAfee,
2012; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). One criticism concerns the highly
uncertain effects of REDD+ implementation in terms of trade-offs be-
tween local livelihoods, biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration
(Corbera and Brown, 2010; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). The prevalent focus
on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation tends to
over-emphasize forests as ‘carbon sinks’ and overlooks other livelihood-
relevant outcomes for local communities, such as non-timber products,
agriculture and livestock (Campbell, 2009; Coomes et al., 2008; Putz and
Redford, 2009).
Too little attention is given to the multiple functions (e.g. income gener-
ation, food security, social security, legal and political legitimacy) that are
potentially or effectively fulfilled by community-based resource systems,
as well as to how local institutions regulate trade-offs between the related
outcomes (Wunder et al., 2008). Carbon sequestration projects that focus on
forested areas often overlook local stakeholders’ interactions with adjacent
pastoral and agricultural areas. In classical REDD+ policy assessments,
opportunity cost baselines are defined based on annual returns per hectare
derived from regional or national secondary data, which are then compared
to carbon market offset prices (Grieg-Gran, 2006). There is very little em-
pirical knowledge about how local stakeholders actually depend on forests
and agriculture for their livelihood and how this translates to reliable carbon
emission estimates.
Justifiable Scepticism about REDD+ Benefits for Local Community Livelihoods
Evaluations of payment for ecosystem services (PES) projects aimed at
compensating local communities for carbon storage in Bolivia and in sev-
eral other Latin American countries showed that benefits for local stake-
holders were generally limited to financial contributions and capacity build-
ing (Caplow et al., 2011; Wunder et al., 2008). These assessments also
highlighted the difficult economic transitions that communities have to go
through in order to make their previous livelihood strategies compatible
with the requirements of a carbon sequestration programme. Other prob-
lems mentioned include high degrees of leakage1 and difficulties in ensuring
permanence, stakeholder liability, and monitoring of carbon sequestration
programmes (Asquith et al., 2002; Hall, 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Peskett et al.,
2008;Wunder andAlba´n, 2008;Wunder et al., 2008). Scholars have stressed
that in the absence of economic alternatives to agriculture, flat payment
1. Leakage in this context occurs when interventions to reduce emissions in one area (sub-
national or national) lead to an increase in emissions elsewhere.
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rates to compensate opportunity costs constitute insufficient incentives for
all farmers to accept involvement in a carbon sequestration project. Hy-
pothetical REDD+ compensation based on current market prices would
suffice to compensate shifting cultivators, but would not be an attractive
monetary incentive to the timber extraction industry, cattle ranchers, and
large-scale commercial producers of soya bean, cocoa and oil palm (Bo¨rner,
2007; Campbell, 2009). What is more, carbon projects can actually harm
particular groups of people under certain circumstances. For small-scale
farmers practising shifting cultivation, even a small decrease in their basic
crop production may represent a significant drop in income or food secu-
rity (Mertz, 2009). Systemic effects on the market prices of basic products
(i.e. rice or maize) due to reduced overall food supply could also directly
affect poor consumers (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). Such direct and indirect
economic effects require specific and careful policy adjustments (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Peskett et al., 2008). Finally, a number of studies call
for more holistic approaches to carbon sequestration projects that consider
the trade-offs between financial PES and multiple land and forest outcomes
(Asquith et al., 2002; Karsenti, 2007; Robertson and Wunder, 2005; Van
Hecken and Bastianensen, 2010).
Adequate Institutional Arrangements under REDD+
Current debates on carbon sequestration address the question of land rights
as a core problem during PES implementation (Cotula and Mayers, 2009;
Savaresi and Morgera, 2009; Sunderlin et al., 2009). Adequate property
rights that clearly relate to ‘carbon producers’ are difficult to establish, and
new institutional arrangements can pose significant threats to traditional re-
source systems (Asquith et al., 2002). In tropical rainforest contexts, resource
appropriation has been accompanied by flexible institutions that reflect the
dynamics of social-ecological systems (Peluso, 1996). A single tree can be
owned by different users and at the same time embedded in various spiritual
beliefs or other social values. Because tropical forest ecosystems are char-
acterized by high subtractability and low excludability, these systems are
better managed collectively than as individual properties (Agrawal, 2007;
Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Studies of carbon sequestration in forests often
remain evasive when it comes to which categories of land rights are most ap-
propriate for implementing PES. Recent approaches have called for greater
participation by indigenous and peasant communities in political decision
making (Sikor et al., 2010) and for acceleration of land titling (Morgera,
2009). However, none of these authors assessed which land rights cate-
gories and related institutional arrangements are best suited for participatory
decision making, for example by evaluating the implications of individual
versus collective land property rights for achieving effectiveness in REDD+
projects.
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Against this background, we argue that a three-dimensional approach fo-
cusing simultaneously on the institutional, socio-economic and biophysical
dimensions of the interconnections between human and natural resource
systems is needed to better understand what could be the effects of imple-
menting the REDD+ programme in tropical forest areas. The main objective
of this article is to compare the current agricultural and forestry practices
of two different population groups living in the same area in the Bolivian
lowlands — the indigenous Tsimane’ and Andean settlers — and to see
how these practices are currently influencing trade-offs between multiple
forest outcomes. More specifically, our research sought to: 1) analyse trade-
offs between multiple productive activities, carbon sequestration, and tree
species diversity conservation; 2) understand how indigenous peoples’ and
settlers’ institutional configurations (particularly local governance and land
rights) influence those trade-offs; and 3) assess potentials and limitations of
REDD+, with a particular focus on specific socio-economic and institutional
characteristics.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted our comparative study in the buffer zone of the Pilo´n Lajas
Biosphere Reserve (PLR) in the Beni department of Bolivia, 370 km north of
La Paz (Figure 1). The PLR lies on the border between two bio-geographical
sub-regions: montane cloud forests (yungas) and the Madeira humid forest.
Six human settlements were selected according to multiple criteria, such as
communities’ willingness to be part of the study, similar distance from the
main road, similar average population density, and communities’ belonging
to the ethnic categories of either indigenous Tsimane’ or Andean settlers.
Considering two ethnic categories allowed a comparison of how different
social-ecological systems, represented by three communities of indigenous
Tsimane’ and three communities of Andean settlers, affect multiple forest
outcomes in a similar ecosystem. This selection implies a clear sociological
differentiation that is important for understanding how local institutional
differences affect potential implementation of a REDD+ mechanism. The
Tsimane’ have been visiting the area since time immemorial, and were
granted a single collective land title for a total of twenty-one communities
in the early 1990s (Bottazzi, 2008; 2009). The settlers belong to a first
generation of Quechua migrants coming mainly from the Andean city of
Potosı´. They were granted individual property titles by the government in
the course of a ‘colonization programme’ launched in the 1970s.
Fieldwork took place from February to July 2011. A survey was applied
to the entire population of the six selected communities, totalling 128 house-
holds, of which sixty-six were Tsimane’ households and sixty-two were
Andean settlers’ households. The criteria for community selection were a
similar population size for Tsimane’ and Andean settlers, as well as a similar
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Figure 1. Study Area: The Pilo´n Lajas Biosphere Reserve and Indigenous
Territory and its Surroundings
distance from the main road (up to thirty minutes on foot). This guaranteed
comparability of our measurements of trade-offs between multiple forest
outcomes at the community scale. Household representatives provided in-
formation about their productive activities, surface of forest clearances,
number of cattle, use of non-timber forest products, and general sociological
characteristics. Average household mobility for each community was calcu-
lated based on the average number of villages in which households spent a
maximum of two weeks in the year prior to their interview.
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Wedefined households’ incomes as the aggregate of cash and consumption
values that a household derives from its various farm and off-farm activities.
Estimates of the levels and the relative proportions of incomes from the
different household activities were established using a methodology based
on two modules:
1. Picture weighting to record farmers’ perception of income propor-
tions: household representatives were presented with a number of pic-
tures showing main sources of household income, and were asked to
distribute twenty-five tokens among these pictures according to the
relative importance of these sources of income in their household’s
economy — the greater the importance, the more tokens (Angelsen
et al., 2011). Based on these weightings of sources of income per
household, the proportion of each income category was then calculated
for each of the two groups— indigenous Tsimane’ and Andean settlers
— for the purpose of comparison.
2. Parcel mapping and agricultural income survey: farmers were asked to
draw amap of their parcels, showing the location of each specific single
crop and combination of mixed crops and indicating the corresponding
cropping periods, surfaces covered, yields and proportions sold on the
market. Farmers were also asked what proportions of the land they
had cleared had previously been old-growth forest and fallow land,
respectively. The focus in this study was on the surface cleared in 2010,
looking back on the one-and-a-half years preceding the survey. In 20
per cent of the cases, we visited the parcels to observe the crops and
asked more specific questions about agricultural techniques, cropping
calendars and uses of products.
Institutional analysis was based on focus groups and qualitative inter-
views. Researchers spent two to three weeks in each community. During
this time, they carried out a cycle of at least three focus groups, held in
the evening with all of the community’s elders — both men and women
— to obtain information about the settlement’s history, community organi-
zation, relationships with external state and non-state organizations in the
area, conflicts over resource appropriation, rules, and possible sanctions. To
complement focus groups, we also carried out semi-structured individual
interviews. All relevant information from focus groups and interviews was
entered in a semi-open survey form based on researchers’ field notes, to
enable systematic comparison between indigenous Tsimane’ and Andean
settlers.
For the purpose of this study, we defined old-growth forest as a dense
forested area that had not been cleared in the previous twenty-five years.
To complement our knowledge about old-growth forest we also assessed
the number of different tree species, as well as forest biomass per hectare.
Interest in old-growth forest is justified by its extremely high vulnerability
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to land clearing, and because it is specifically targeted by carbon capture and
conservation programmes. Land cover was mapped using Landsat images
taken in three different years.2 For visualization purposes, several colour
composite images were first created for each year.3 In addition, a principal
component analysis (PCA) was performed on six bands (1 to 5 and 7). To
improve the precision of the old-growth forest/non-forest map in selected
areas, data were digitalizedmanually.4 The result was checked against SPOT
images available for some areas and compared with a sample of field obser-
vations representing each class of forest and non-forest for the 2011 image.
Old-growth forest areas were then calculated for a time series covering the
years 2001, 2006 and 2011. By subtracting the total forest area in 2006 from
that in 2001, and that in 2011 from that in 2006, we deduced deforestation
during the two five-year periods of 2001–6 and 2006–11.
Old-growth forest species diversity and biomass were assessed by sam-
pling a total of 320 forest plots (thirty to ninety in each village depending
on forest size, resulting in a sampling error of no more than 10 per cent).
Plot locations were determined using the random function in the ArcMap
GIS software. Each plot consisted of three concentric circles. Within a ra-
dius of 10 m, we sampled all individual plants with a diameter at breast
height (DBH) greater than 10 cm (upper-stem and mature trees); within a
radius of 3 m, we registered all individual plants with a DBH of 3–10 cm
(saplings); and within a radius of 0.5 m we recorded all natural regeneration
and individual herbaceous plants. Forest sampling was carried out in direct
collaboration with hired villagers. The resulting empirical data were used
to calculate species diversity (H’) using the Shannon-Wiener index (O¨nal,
1997). Above-ground biomass and carbon were calculated using Brown’s
methodology (Brown, 1997). Finally, we also calculated the opportunity
cost of reducing CO2 emission from agriculture for each settlement, using
the methodology developed by Pagiola (2009) and taking the complete 2010
farming seasons as a reference.
RESULTS
History of Settlements
The Pilo´n Lajas Biosphere Reserve and Indigenous Territory (PLR) was
created in 1992 by presidential decree. This happened in response to years
of persistent demands and struggles by indigenous Tsimane’ and Mosetene
2. TM and ETM+ sensors, spatial resolution: 30 m, reference coordinates: WRS-2 Path =
001/Row = 070. Two Landsat7 ETM+ images dated 2001–06–29 and 2006–08–23, one
Landsat5 TM image dated 2011–11–08.
3. Red-Green-Blue combinations of TM/ETM+ bands 4–5–3, 7–4–3, and 3–2–1.
4. This detailed visual interpretation was possible because the surface covered was fairly
limited (i.e., equivalent to less than 500 × 500 pixels).
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groups for access to land and natural resources. In 1997, their right to the land
was additionally recognized in a land title granting them common property
rights and declaring the land as non-mortgageable and non-divisible. The
Tsimane’ group originated mainly from the neighbouring municipal territo-
ries of San Borja along theManiqui river. They have been accessing the PLR
area since time immemorial for hunting and fishing. Tsimane’ populations
follow a pattern of intense movement, which means that groups leave their
communities of origin for periods ranging from several weeks, or a season,
to multiple years. This high level of mobility is a cultural characteristic that
allows them to gather natural resources and transmit techniques, knowledge
and agricultural practices and resources across a fairly vast territory. The
movement patterns depend on complex mechanisms of socialization and on
changes in resource availability over time (Ellis, 1996).
Andean indigenous people have settled in the eastern part of the PLR.Their
settlement began with the launch of a large government project in 1974,5 in
the course of which the National Institute of Colonization distributed land
to settlers. The units of land distributed were called colonias; each colonia
was composed of approximately forty parcels of 25 hectares per family,
amounting to a total surface of 1,000 to 1,500 hectares including a common
parcel. The first migrants arrived in the middle of the 1980s, mostly from
the Andean city of Potosı´, where the collapse of the mining industry had left
many people unemployed. Each settlement has a population of around 50 to
100 individuals. Some households own more than one parcel and share the
land between several family members. Around 80 per cent of the settlers still
belong to the first migrant generation. Only a few houses are located on the
cultivated parcels, as 95 per cent of the families have their main residence
in the village of El Palmar. The relationship between Tsimane’ and Andean
settlers is generally collaborative; occasional conflicts are mainly over land
and resource appropriation. These conflicts have diminished considerably
since the land registration process in 2003, during which both groups were
granted formal land titles.
Main Institutions and Governance Process
Local communities are struggling to find appropriate arrangements that entail
acceptable trade-offs between forest benefits, institutional transaction costs
and forest sustainability. The main and formally elected authority of the
Tsimane’ is the corregidor, whosemain function is conflict regulation. In two
of the threeTsimane’ communities studied, power—expressed, for example,
in the authority to regulate access to timber — has been concentrated in the
hands of a few individuals who mainly belong to the same family and who
generate more income from timber extraction than the rest of the community.
5. Supreme Decree No 11565 of 27 July 1973.
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Since the local elite has failed to define clear rules for timber extraction,
conflicts between community members over access to forest resources are
frequent. The third Tsimane’ community decided to clarify their forest rules
and make sure the rules conform with national forestry law. To this end,
the community adopted a formal forest management plan and delegated its
implementation to a local (non-indigenous) enterprise. This has resulted in
permanent conflict between the community and the forest enterprise because
benefits for community members have dropped to unacceptably low levels.
The three Tsimane’ communities studied are part of a larger set of twenty-
one communities whose representatives elect a regional authority called
the Consejo Regional Tsimane’ Moseten’ (CRTM). The CRTM represents
the Tsimane’ and Mosetene communities of the PLR in regional politi-
cal processes; however, it has no control over local forest management
and extraction. Local communities and the CRTM depend heavily on the
Biosphere Reserve Authority (BRA), which is composed of a director and
a management committee appointed by the National Service of Protected
Areas (SERNAP). The relationship between the BRA and the indigenous
communities is characterized by permanent conflict, mainly over infringe-
ments of national rules — to be enforced by the BRA — that forbid timber
extraction. So far, the BRA has not succeeded in stopping timber extraction
in the protected area and its buffer zone.
In the Andean migrant settlements, the main institution is the sindicato
(Spanish for labour union). The sindicato is composed of the parcel owners
(mainly men) and their families. An executive board is elected every year at
an annual assembly. Board members assume certain duties (cargos) consist-
ing of administrative responsibilities that are renewed on the basis of annual
rotation. The executive board manages a larger common parcel situated at
the centre of the sindicato’s territory. This provides the board with the re-
sources required for its functioning. Part of the common parcel can also
be rented to sindicato members for commercial purposes or to temporarily
help farmers lacking land. Many communities have placed a small part of
the common forestland under protection, mainly to ensure members’ access
to forest biodiversity in the form of medicinal plants and other non-timber
forest products (NTFPs). Families work their parcels individually, but are
required to participate in certain collective tasks, such as road maintenance,
and to pay regular taxes, which are used to cover the financial expenses of
the sindicato. The sindicato can seize the land of an uncooperative member
and sell it to another member. All resources contained in an individual parcel
belong to the owner and are not subject to any restrictions on use or extrac-
tion by the sindicato. Themain conditions owners must fulfil in order to keep
their parcel are to work it, be present at meetings, pay taxes, and perform the
rotating duties of the community organization. Each local sindicato is part
of a broader organization called the Federation of Agroecological Producers
of Yucumo (FEPAY), which is the Andean settlers’ main political organi-
zation at the provincial level. Despite its name, FEPAY is more involved
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Table 1. General Characteristics of Communities Studied
Tsimane’ Settlers
Alto Santa Bajo El Nueva Villa
Colorado Rosita Colorado Mean Bala Bele´n Imperial Mean
Year of founding 1950 1964 1970 1961 1987 1990 1983 1987
Population 167 68 133 122.7 87 47 152 95.3
Number of households 27 17 22 22.0 17 16 29 20.7
Pop. density (fam./ha) 0.028 0.025 0.262 0.1 0.036 0.033 0.103 0.1
Mobilitya 33 36 36 35.0 21 23 47 30.3
Educationb 7.9 7.1 5.6 6.9 9.4 9.8 12.8 10.7
Notes: a) Mobility is the average number of villages in which community households spent a maximum of
two weeks in the year prior to their interview
b) Education is the average number of years of schooling per individual
in supporting agriculture production than sustainable forestry. In the past
decades, FEPAY played an important role in advocating formal recognition
of settlers’ property rights through a process of land registration. Table 1
presents some general characteristics of the communities studied.
Productive Strategies, Land Use and Household Incomes
In Tsimane’ communities, the generalized collective appropriation of land
allows for great agricultural flexibility and fosters crop rotation. Household
heads must obtain permission from the corregidor to establish their culti-
vation areas. Agricultural production is based on a rotation of rice, maize,
cassava and plantain. The forest area cleared in 2010 for agriculture ranges
from 1 to 2 ha per family. Small surpluses of agricultural products are sold on
local markets. Cooperation between families is uncommon when it comes to
agriculture. Cattle breeding is amarginal activity for Tsimane’ families (3 per
cent of household income). During fieldwork in the three Tsimane’ commu-
nities we counted a total of forty-seven cattle; these were distributed among
only 5 per cent of the families, with each family owning between one and
thirty animals. Meat consumption and trade is based on hunting and fishing,
which, however, account for only 7 per cent of household incomes on aver-
age (see Figure 2). Hunted game is divided between family members, and
part of the product is dried for storage. Plant use for medicine and nutrition
is also important: one study showed that Tsimane’ communities based along
the Maniqui River used 114 different plants for medicinal purposes. This
knowledge also has a high potential for commercialization (Reyes-Garcı´a
et al., 2006). Extraction practices are regulated by multiple rules based on
the Tsimane’ cosmology, according to which non-human entities such as
animals and spirits control the use of renewable resources (Daillant, 1998;
2003). In the communities visited, all families extract non-timber products,
especially ‘jatata’ (Geonoma diversa), which is used to build roofs and is
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Figure 2. Perceived Importance of Agriculture, Forestry and Other Activities to
Household Income (in per cent of total household incomes)
sold on the local market. Handcrafted non-timber forest products account
for about 6 per cent of household incomes. Mobility for fishing, hunting and
gathering NTFP is also quite important and can last several weeks during
different periods of the year. These extractive activities are based on kinship
rules and reflect several fundamental aspects of socio-cultural reproduction
(Castillo, 1988). Internal community rules define extraction sites and the
distribution of resources for each family or clan. Families considered as
‘permanent’ residents of the community are authorized to extract resources
by the main authority, the corregidor. Hunting and fishing have declined in
the nearby areas due to the damage caused by the forest companies over the
last twenty years, but are now growing in the more remote core area of the
reserve (WCS, 2005).
Except for cattle breeding and cultivation of permanent crops, the An-
dean settlers’ agricultural practices are similar to those of the Tsimane’. The
forest area cleared in 2010 for agriculture ranges between 1.5 and 2 ha per
family, and crops include cassava, rice and/or corn. Annual crops contribute
27.8 per cent of settlers’ total household income, which is clearly a higher
proportion than in the case of the Tsimane’, who generate only 22.5 per
cent of their income from agriculture. Perennial crops (plantain, citrus and
cacao) are likewise important sources of revenue (24 per cent of house-
hold incomes). Households practise hunting and fishing only as occasional
or leisure activities; these account for only 1.6 per cent of total household
income. Forest fruits (NTFP) from individual parcels or common land con-
tribute even less, at 1.3 per cent. Both categories are clearly more important
to Tsimane’ households, contributing 6.6 and 7 per cent, respectively, to
their total income.
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, settlers have received credits from small
financial agencies, bypassing national legal restrictions on small properties.6
Credits are only partially invested in agriculture, as the example of Villa
Imperial illustrates.7 Of a total credit sum that thirty-five families received
during the five years preceding the survey (US$ 12,250), 53 per cent was
invested in off-farm activities such as commerce and transportation. Almost
all settler families have at least one adult member mainly engaged in non-
agricultural activities (woodwork, wage labour, trade, local transport). Most
settler families employ landless migrants or local indigenous people as wage
labourers (mainly for forest clearing and harvesting) in order to reduce the
time they themselves spend on agriculture and to increase their involvement
in off-farm activities.
Family savings and another 40 per cent of the credits received were
invested in cattle. At the time of our investigation (2011), Andean settlers
in the three communities owned a total of 310 cattle. The distribution of
cattle among the families was not uniform: only 5 per cent of the households
owned thirty to fifty-five cattle (standard deviation: eleven), and 25 per cent
owned less than thirty cattle. In fact, breeding is not considered a highly
profitable activity, especially on small parcels up to 25 ha; it represents
a form of financial insurance rather than a regular monetary income (2.8
per cent of household perceived income for indigenous people and 9.5 per
cent for Andean settlers). Despite the small number of large-scale cattle
owners, most land conversion is from forest to pasture, especially in settlers’
areas. The reason lies in the widespread practice of renting land to large-
scale cattle owners, regardless of whether they are a member of the same
sindicato. Indeed, a local parcel-renting market is currently emerging based
on the property rights of landowners. This practice is contributing to soil
compaction and massive conversion of forest to pasture.
Carbon Emission, Biomass and Species Diversity
Table 2 shows that the different production strategies are having distinct
impacts on CO2 emission, biomass reduction and species diversity. CO2
emissions are much higher for Andean settlers’ communities than for the
Tsimane’ communities. The two main reasons for this are that the settlers’
productive system is clearly more oriented towards agriculture and cattle
production, and that the Tsimane’ are considerably more involved in forest
extraction. In the period 2001–6, the settlers deforested more than twice the
6. According to national law, a small property is indivisible and a family patrimony; it cannot
be mortgaged (Art. 41 par. 2, INRA Law No. 1715 of 1996). But since the sindicato offers
a refunding guarantee, several financial agencies are willing to issue loans. In case of non-
reimbursement, the sindicato withdraws the title from the individual owner and sells it
directly to someone else.
7. Villa Imperial is the only community that agreed to share information about this critical
aspect.
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Table 2. Forest Characteristics in Tsimane’ and Settlers’ Communities
Tsimane’ Settlers
Santa Alto Bajo Nueva Villa El
Rosita Colorado Colorado Mean Belem Imperial Bala Mean
Total surface (ha) 2,723 6,032 508 3,088 1,443 1,465 2,389 1,766
Old-growth forest
(ha)
2,070 5,563 250 2,628 1,193 699 1,983 1,291
Net deforestation,
2001–2006 (in
per cent of
forested area)
3.6 4.0 27.0 5.1 12.3 29.9 7.5 13.9
Net deforestation,
2006–2011 (in
per cent of
forested area)
7.3 2.3 22.8 4.5 10.7 8.7 7.9 9.0
Number of species
in old-growth
forest
123 130 120 124 132 113 129 125
Species diversity
H’ in old-growth
forest
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6
Above-ground
biomass
(tons/ha)
259 260 259 259 568 389 340 432
Total carbon in
secondary forest
(tons/ha)
130 130 129 130 284 194 170 216
Carbon stock (tons) 268,329 723,569 32,428 341,442 338,689 135,832 336,986 270,502
Average annual
CO2 emission,*
2001–2006
2,152 6,165 3,107 3,808 10,619 12,677 5,948 9,748
Average annual
CO2 emission,
2006–2011
4,253 3,460 1,916 3,209 8,120 2,605 5,812 5,513
Note: * Calculated on the basis of net deforestation and carbon density in each community
area deforested by the Tsimane’. In the period 2006–11, deforestation among
settlers decreased considerably compared to the previous five-year period.
According to our interviewees, this is due to a reduction in the available
area for forest clearing, which forced settlers to intensify their production.
The high carbon stocks in Tsimane’ forests can be explained by the fact that
indigenous groups own larger areas of common land than settler groups.
Unlike overall carbon stocks, biomass per hectare is much lower in
Tsimane’ forests (259 tons/ha) than in Andean settlers’ forests (432 tons/ha).
This can be explained by the higher degree of degradation in Tsimane’ forests
due to their extractive practices. In recent decades, indigenous Tsimane’ so-
cieties have undergone major changes due to contact with external agents
from the logging sector, market inclusion, and the increasing proximity of
urban centres (Bottazzi, 2008; 2009; Godoy, 2001). At present, most Tsi-
mane’ families are heavily involved in forest extraction tomeet their financial
needs. Logging accounts for 10.6 per cent of their monetary income, and they
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Table 3. Opportunity Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions from Tsimane’
and Settlers’ Agriculture
Tsimane’ Settlers
Santa Alto Bajo El Villa Nueva
Rosita Colorado Colorado Mean Bala Imperial Bele´n Mean
Area cleared in
2010 for new
crops (ha)
21 36 52 37 28 35 28 30
Net present value
(NPV) of
agriculture
(US$/ha)
505 567 446 506 491 730 344 522
Opportunity cost
(US$/tCO2)
1.62 1.70 1.44 1.59 2.56 2.88 1.01 2.15
Proportion of crops
grown on
previously
fallow land (%
of land cleared
in 2010)
47 40 48 45 95 83 79 86
extract 500–1,000 m2 of timber annually. At 6.1 per cent, logging generates
a considerably smaller portion of Andean settlers’ income. Nonetheless,
this difference in extractive practices has only a slight impact on species
diversity, which differs by only 0.1 H’. This is because the timber mar-
ket concentrates on very few highly valuable species, including mahogany
(Swietenia macrophylla), cedar (Cedrela spp.) and Amburana cearensis.
Opportunity Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions
Data presented so far show that Tsimane’ and Andean settlers’ different
institutional forms of natural resource appropriation result in different pat-
terns of household income composition, with varying effects on carbon
emissions, but not so much on tree species diversity. This means that the
manifold site-specific trade-offs between agriculture and forestry influence
the opportunity costs of human activity in several ways. The opportunity
cost of reducing carbon emissions from agriculture and cattle production
in 2010 amounted to US$ 1.59/tCO2 for the Tsimane’ and US$ 2.15/tCO2
for the Andean settlers (see Table 3).8 The main reasons for this difference
are: (1) Tsimane’ cultivation techniques produce lower yields compared to
settlers’ agricultural practices; (2) Tsimane’ produce less cattle than the set-
tlers; and (3) Tsimane’ clear a larger proportion of dense old-growth forest
than the settlers to establish new fields, which is more labour-intensive than
8. In 2011, the non-governmental organization Conservation International assessed opportu-
nity costs in a closed area including some of the communities that are part of our case study,
and found that 80 per cent of forest conversion, including for large-scale cattle ranching,
corresponded to an average opportunity cost of US$ 2.01 per ton of CO2.
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clearing fallow land (in 2010, 55 per cent of the forest area cleared by the
Tsimane’ was in old-growth forests, releasing about 130 tons of CO2 per
ha). The Andean settlers’ farming system generates higher annual opportu-
nity costs of reducing carbon emissions because a large proportion of the
annually cleared areas is on land that has been fallow for five to eleven years
and hence has a lower carbon density (in 2010, 86 per cent of the forest
area cleared was on fallow land, releasing about 59 tons of CO2 per ha). In
addition, Andean settlers use farming techniques (e.g. fertilizer application)
that generate higher yields, and earn more income from cattle breeding or
pasture renting. The disappearance of primary and old-growth forest on the
settlers’ land forces them to intensify production, for example through more
intense soil management and long-term investment in permanent crops.
DISCUSSION
Our empirical comparison between Tsimane’ and Andean settlers is an
attempt to shed light on how different socio-institutional characteristics
influence trade-offs between multiple forest-related outcomes in the same
ecological context (Figure 3). Based on the main trade-offs targeted by
carbon sequestration and conservation programmes, we focused in particular
on local drivers of sustainability, property rights systems, local enforcement
and governance processes. This section will look at each of these in turn.
Understanding Local Drivers of Sustainability
Tsimane’ ecological knowledge allows a variety of collecting practices and
reduces risks of market dependencies and monoculture. Human mobility
makes individuals circulate in accordance with resource mobility and avail-
ability over time, and allows them to share knowledge and cultural practices
about forest multiple incomes with other members of their community.
Small-scale shifting cultivation and collective (rather than individual) use
of pasture areas are flexible forms of land use that allow time and space
for forest regrowth. The relatively low market integration of the Tsimane’
leads them to maintain subsistence cultures and diversify both their food
consumption and their sources of income by harvesting non-timber forest
products. The result is a high degree ofwin-win synergies between household
incomes and forest cover. However, external socio-environmental changes
along the Pilo´n Lajas buffer zone frontier are deeply influencing Tsimane’
society: loss of hunting resources, acceleration of land cover change from
forest to pasture in adjacent areas, loss of relevant ecological knowledge,
and changes in consumption patterns are among the processes leading to fun-
damental behavioural transformations in Tsimane’ societies (Reyes-Garcı´a
et al., 2007).
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Figure 3. Trade-offs and Synergies between Livelihoods, Species Diversity
Conservation and Carbon Sequestration in Indigenous Tsimane’ and Andean
Settlers’ Communities
Note: The index is constructed as the sum of the mean values for Tsimane’ and Andean
settlers, respectively, for each indicator category described in the results part. For the purpose
of comparison, we represented the share of each group on a 100 per cent scale.
For the Andean migrants, the situation is quite different. Their produc-
tive system is oriented towards more short-term yield with lower labour
investment and a low diversification of NTFP extraction. Agricultural pro-
duction is coupled with growing investments in off-farm activities, resulting
in stronger market and monetary integration. The settlers’ focus on cattle
breeding makes land a resource per se, which is used as a kind of finan-
cial insurance for times of hardship and extraordinary events such as health
problems or social obligations. Once land is converted to pasture, it be-
comes difficult to relaunch agricultural production, especially since there
are still no technical means for tillage (Mattos and Uhl, 1994). Thus, some
individual parcels have become ‘stored resources’ for medium-term finan-
cial investment with minimal labour input. This has considerable negative
consequences in terms of deforestation and carbon emission.
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In this context, where both societies depend heavily on agriculture, a
strictly offset-based financial compensation for reducing activities would be
risky. The dependence of beneficiaries on external or market funding in such
compensated reduction schemes poses challengeswith regard to permanency
and food security; reasons for this include the current absence of sustainable
and profitable alternatives to agriculture and forest extraction, as well as the
importance of these activities in the overall context of economic and social
practices in Tsimane’ and Andean settlers’ societies. Most assessments of
the opportunity cost of carbon sequestration are based on the speculative
assumption that in the absence of agricultural activity, farmers will automat-
ically find a substitute activity in a closed area that will compensate them
for the work on their parcel (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008; Grieg-Gran, 2006;
Pagiola, 2009). Our research determined an average opportunity cost of US$
1.87 per ton of CO2 emission from agriculture across both groups. While
this net value is probably lower than the carbon market price, it does not
include the value of labour that farmers recover by selling their products
on the local market. In the absence of profitable economic alternatives that
could absorb labour in the area, the payment of opportunity costs based on
net benefit (excluding labour input) would not suffice to compensate the
full opportunity cost of farmers’ current agricultural activities. Besides, the
dependence of other economic sectors on agriculture (e.g. food trade, wage
labour input, transport, etc.) means that these sectors might also be affected
by a reduction in food production. Carbon sequestration payments based
on the principle of compensated reduction of agricultural activities would
therefore affect local livelihoods both directly and indirectly. Moreover, a
radical change in carbon prices or the discontinuation of payments by donors
would have harmful effects on local communities if they relied exclusively
on the carbon market.
REDD+ eligibility requirements can also lead to inequalities between
groups that are not eligible in the same way for PES. The principle of ‘addi-
tionality’ requires that a REDD+ project must demonstrate real, measurable
and long-term benefits in terms of reduced carbon emissions compared to
so-called business as usual.9 Different scenarios (national versus local base-
line or stock-based versus emissions-based approaches10) produce different
levels of compensation for different forest user groups (Angelsen, 2008). For
Andean settlers, an emissions-based approach would be much more prof-
itable than a stock-based approach, considering that their emissions have
been higher than those of indigenous groups in recent decades. For the
9. Business as usual is a policy-neutral reference scenario for future emissions; that is, pro-
jections of future emission levels in the absence of any policy changes or REDD activities
(Angelsen, 2008: 136).
10. The emissions-based (or flow-based) approach measures and credits only the net changes in
carbon stocks over time (emissions). The stock-based approach makes payments a function
of the total carbon stock in the forest at any one time (i.e., absolute levels, and not changes)
(Angelsen, 2008: 17)
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Tsimane’, by contrast, the emission-based approach would not be profitable
at all, as they have cleared less forest and their carbon stocks are still consid-
erable. This means that using the same baseline would simply lead to greater
inequalities11 and could encourage the less advantaged groups to ‘protest’
by increasing illegal extraction. A basic understanding of local settlement
history and current productive strategies is indispensable for defining an ap-
propriate mechanism. This, in turn, can only be achieved based on medium-
to long-term cooperation between the multiple stakeholders involved in a
REDD+ project with the aim of jointly implementing concrete inputs (in-
stitutional or technical) rather than mere remote-sensing based monitoring
of emission reduction.
Accordingly, REDD+ implementation should be based mainly on sup-
porting local initiatives leading to concrete improvement of existing al-
ternatives, such as sustainable intensification of mixed systems (Herrero
et al., 2009). As we observed, recent pressure on old-growth forest areas
has induced a change in settlers’ perception of their productive systems’
economic sustainability. Between 2005 and 2011, a growing number of
households started to invest in medium- to long-term agroforestry systems,
planting perennial crops (e.g. citrus and cocoa) or managing soil quality
by growing mixed crops and nitrogen-fixing plants during managed fallows
(e.g. by cultivating kudzu (Pueraria phaseoloides) or kanaulali (Canavalia
ensiformis)) — measures that are expected to result in higher yields after
three to five years. These experiences mean that reduction of CO2 emissions
by deforestation of the whole agroforestry system can be compensated by
implementing different and more intensive agricultural production systems.
As demonstrated in similar contexts, if such agroforestry systems are ac-
companied by cash crop or subsistence crop agriculture based on a rotation
of annual and perennial crops followed by a fallow period of five to eleven
years, the system could achieve acceptable viability over time (Leakey and
Tchoundjeu, 2001; Smith and Scherr, 2003; Soto-Pinto et al., 2010; Ticktin
et al., 2003). However, our interviews indicate that for poor Tsimane’ and
Andean settlers’ households, investment in longer-term agroforestry systems
still means a considerable shortage of income in the short term, which many
of them cannot afford, even though it has been demonstrated that these sys-
tems produce profitable and sustainable yields in the long run (Milz, 2010).
This explains why farmers in the area hesitate to make such investments.
Nonetheless, an adequately framed REDD+ project, embedded in settlers’
and indigenous people’s current practices and experiences and based on their
willingness to be part of such an experience, would be more effective than a
11. Such differences amongusers also require a better understanding of physical carbon emission
mechanisms (degradation versus deforestation, forest fallow versus old-growth forest).
Applying the UNFCCC Tier1 monitoring standard, for example, would mean focusing
exclusively on deforestation, while completely disregarding the type of degradation caused
by the Tsimane’.
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strict top-down monetary scheme of compensated reduction. However, such
collaboration based on external funding would require adequate property
rights and institutional arrangements.
Flexible Property Rights and Strong Local Enforcement
Securing property rights, individual or collective, is not a sufficient measure
to improve effectiveness of REDD+ implementation (Palmer, 2011). Local
institutions need to have a strong enforcement capacity and environmental
norms have to be implemented in order to improve the sustainability of
social-ecological systems (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2008). As we saw in our
case study, property rights have a strong influence on productive strategies.
They can have positive effects — such as encouraging innovation and inten-
sification of agricultural production or a shift from annual to perennial crops
— as well as various ‘perverse’ effects resulting in deforestation or forest
degradation. Comparison between Tsimane’ andAndean settlers’ productive
logics gives us a contrasting illustration of how institutional patterns influ-
ence socio-ecological processes. A PES or REDD+ intervention in such a
differentiated context should strive for an equilibrium between the financial
value of land, the population’s mobility, the opportunity cost for appropri-
ators to move to another sector and, more importantly, actors’ institutional
motivations to participate in a conservation process (Vatn, 2010).
A collective property system like that of the Tsimane’, which is charac-
terized by highly flexible resource use (common pasture area, circulation
of cultivated areas, use of a diversity of non-timber forest products), allows
for greater compatibility between social and ecological systems. External
exclusion is enforced to a considerable degree on collective land owned by
indigenous people. Moreover, the indigenous collective owners do not have
the option to sell, divide or mortgage their land. Thus, such land per se has
almost no economic market value, which reduces the risk of market prices
for land exceeding the value of productive practices. This is an advantage
over the quasi-individual property system of the Andean settlers. However,
the institutional potentials of Tsimane’ resource appropriation for preserving
social-ecological systems suffer from a lack of local enforcement of rules.
The Tsimane’ communities’ internal institutional arrangements are gener-
ally unclear and leave room for uncertainties about how resources are to
be managed and distributed. These permanent uncertainties lead to specific
forms of quasi-open access and favour elite capture of benefits, which in turn
can lead to high levels of forest degradation. Implementation of REDD+
in such a context would certainly come at a lower cost per hectare (due
to low opportunity costs and low carbon emissions), but it would involve
higher transaction costs and higher risk of leakage due to low excludability
and weak internal arrangements. In this case, REDD+ could have vari-
ous effects: for example, it could create pressure to privatize land access
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with a view to avoiding conflicts, or it could incentivize a process among
stakeholders towards collective sustainable forest management.
In theAndean settlements, regardless of the quasi-private property regime,
collective norms are abundant and individuals depend heavily on each other
due to the power of their collectively governed local political bodies. Hence,
although each parcel of land is clearly delineated, its alienation is condi-
tioned by strong political control of the local sindicato. However, the high
institutional capacity of Andean settlers has little positive impact on the sus-
tainability of their agro-ecological system. On the contrary: the high level of
deforestation in the settlements can be explained by a relationship between
the land category, the robustness of political organization in the sindicato,
and the productive system. For most settlers, private property is a way of
producing short-term revenue on land without investing much in labour —
by obtaining credit, converting the land to pasture, and investing into cattle
as a financial saving strategy. The land can be sold anytime or rented to cattle
owners thanks to the strong support of individual property rights offered by
the local sindicato and the state. This clear individual division of land leads
to lower transaction costs for managing resources, but the potential financial
value of land and hence the opportunity cost of carbon sequestration rela-
tive to productive activities is higher as well (in the Andean settlements it
was US$ 0.65 higher per ton of CO2 than in the Tsimane’ settlements). In
this context, a REDD+ compensated reduction mechanism would be more
expensive for investors but would incur lower transaction costs. The robust
local institutions would enable the local sindicatos to clearly identify and
guide the participation of each landowner.
As the case study has shown, the effects of productive strategies on carbon
emission do not follow a strict logic of pursuit of financial income. They are
also shaped by land users’ strategies to achieve ‘resource security’ (Cotula
and Mayers, 2009). Accordingly, REDD+ implementation in the context
of this type of property system could not be based strictly on compensat-
ing opportunity cost of production, but would require a process of further
entitlement (Leach et al., 1999) — especially in the case of indigenous peo-
ple, who have received access rights to land but still lack full extractive or
use rights to forest resources (Asquith et al., 2002; Bottazzi, 2009; Doherty
and Schroeder, 2011). Indeed, this is the reason why they are caught in a
quasi-open access situation. In our understanding, an adequate institutional
arrangement would have to strike a balance between users’ need to secure
land and the enforcement of societal control over the ecological effects of
the various land uses.
More recent trends in Bolivia are actually moving towards promoting the
establishment of intermediate forms of tenure that allow better articulation
of individual and collective land rights. We think that this option would
be favourable for REDD+ implementation and, more generally, for sus-
tainable forest use. Such new land categories would be formalized at the
communal level under a single collective title, but the local authority would
then have the authority to distribute the land to individuals according to the
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community’s own governance principles. The resulting land and resource
distribution could then be formalized again by the government authorities
or left open, depending on the community’s needs. Such arrangements have
already been implemented in certain areas in the highlands; in the lowlands,
however, the idea ismet with strong resistance by some factions who fear ter-
ritorial loss and fragmentation (Chumacero et al., 2009; Urioste et al., 2007).
Recognition of communal authorities by the national government and the
municipality has also been advocated by institutional theorists, who argue in
favour of legitimizing communal self-organization and promoting adapted
arrangements that allow for spatial divisions based on local communities’
own criteria (Ostrom, 2000). This would provide a basis for enforcing the lia-
bility of forest user groups without completely compromising the specificity
of socio-ecological patterns in the societies involved.
REDD+ in an Adaptive and Multi-level Governance Process
Differences among local governance structures call for adapting the mech-
anisms of the REDD+ programme to each individual situation, taking into
consideration the coherence of national policy frameworks and trying to
avoid contradictory legislation or laws (Hall, 2008). Success of REDD+
implementation depends on the existence of a decentralized self-organized
governance system (Hayes and Persha, 2010; Wunder and Alba´n, 2008).
Our comparative case study has shown how historical processes and socio-
cultural characteristics can produce contrasting institutional configurations
at the local level in areas that are geographically close to each other. In
the case of the Tsimane’, the relative change from sustainable to unsustain-
able forest use is facilitated by a lack of regulation at the local level and
by the weak governance capacity of local and regional indigenous organiza-
tions. Conversely, Andean settlers have strong local and regional governance
structures, but have become widely involved in an emerging land market.
By investing in cattle breeding, they are striving for short-term economic
benefits while reducing labour inputs. Implementation of a PES programme
such as REDD+ in such differentiated contexts would certainly require a
lengthy process with high transaction costs, as it could not be achieved with-
out specific institutional arrangements for each group. REDD+ institutional
mechanisms cannot be determined by external agents but must be proposed
in a process of regional and local consultation led by the indigenous people
or by farmers themselves (Blom et al., 2010). This participatory process
would ensure that each programme is embedded in the different popula-
tion segments, thus avoiding the risk of benefit capture by local elites, as
demonstrated in previous PES projects (Wunder et al., 2008).
Strong local enforcement requires a coherent national resource regime
and an adaptive multi-level governance structure (Termeer et al., 2010).
As we have seen, deforestation is not driven exclusively by the pursuit of
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maximum short-term benefits, but also represents a way of securing property
rights and access to credit. As has been shown in other Amazonian areas as
well, this strategy has been a strong incentive for converting forest to pasture,
especially because some legislation declares forest clearance a prerequisite
for securing property rights (Angelsen, 1999). Indeed, local implementation
of REDD+ should be accompanied by the amendment of complementary
land and resource legislation to avoid fundamental contradictions between
sustainability principles put forth by the REDD+ programme in the forestry
sector and regulations regarding the use of other resources, such as water,
land, soil nutrients, oil and gas, or even leisure activities like ecotourism.
More precisely, a reform of the entire forestry regime is urgently needed
in Bolivia. During the neoliberal regime, most policies sought to increase
peasant productivity in response to international demand for soya and beef
from the Bolivian lowlands (Pacheco et al., 2010). Since the last forestry
reform in 1996 there have been very few incentives to encourage sustainable
community forestry. Despite some small amendments, the forestry law still
favours large-scale forest enterprises based on the concession principle and
encourages purely commercial timber extraction that ignores more com-
prehensive forms of forest use by local communities. A new forestry law
should facilitate administrative procedures for local communities to have a
management plan approved and self-implemented by their members. The
new law should also allow for non-timber forest products regulation in order
to facilitate access to these resources and their use, further processing, and
distribution. The Morales government has retained the former forest policy
principles, while reducing or even completely stopping monitoring activities
in an effort to cut government expenditures and respond to demands for local
self-determination (Redo et al., 2011). The main reforms undertaken since
2006 are concerned with land redistribution and have not addressed forestry
issues (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012). Recent evaluations show that only 5 per
cent of the potential for sustainable forest management has been realized in
Bolivia, and that 50 per cent of all Bolivian timber is still extracted illegally
(Pellegrini and Dasgupta, 2011).
CONCLUSION
In a recent letter addressed to the ‘indigenous brothers of the world’,12 Bo-
livian President Evo Morales strongly condemned the ‘commodification of
nature’ potentially represented by the REDD+ mechanism. His main criti-
cism, shared by a number of scholars, is that such an international market
mechanism to reduce forest carbon emissions would allow richer, mostly
12. Published on http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/10/07/presidents-letter-to-the-indigenous-
peoplesnature-forests-and-indigenous-peoples-are-not-for-sale/ (accessed on 20 December
2012).
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industrialized countries to maintain high carbon emissions, while restricting
poorer countries’ development options and turning them into providers of
cheap ecological services (Lohmann, 2009; 2011; McAfee, 2012). In that
sense, transnational economic forces and international legislation, by im-
posing liberal measures on economically weaker countries, play a role that
is frequently counterproductive, with harmful consequences for local agri-
culture, NTFPs and biodiversity (Amanor, 2012; Borras et al., 2012). Nev-
ertheless, a clear distinction has to be made between the origin of REDD+
funds (market, private or public donors) and the criteria for the distribution
of PES/REDD+ funds to local communities; the present article focuses on
the latter.
Our findings further justify warnings against uncritical promotion of
REDD+ and PES. The case studies have shown that the most critical factors
or risks related to REDD+ and PES are: (1) the potential reinforcement of
economic inequalities due to different past and expected impacts of land
uses on ecosystems (baseline) depending on the socio-cultural groups tar-
geted; (2) pressure on land used for food production, potentially leading
to a reduction in food security and pushing labour towards scarce off-farm
income opportunities (Peskett et al., 2008); (3) increasing dependence on
external funding and carbon market fluctuations rather than local produc-
tive strategies; and (4) creation of new incentives for land privatization and
commodification to avoid transaction costs under collective property rights.
However, the potential risks of REDD+ and PES implementation should
not automatically exclude the possibility of indigenous people and peas-
ants in forested tropical areas potentially benefiting from such initiatives
under certain conditions. To prevent ‘perverse effects’, REDD+ and PES
mechanisms should be used to help improve the governance capacity of ex-
isting collective and quasi-private land and natural resource property rights
while favouring input-based scenarios, such as sustainable soil and forest
management. As shown in our study, local societies have already started to
develop productive and institutional strategies aimed at reducing the negative
effects of their various uses of land. So far, these strategies have remained
weak in the Bolivian lowlands due to a lack of financial, institutional and
technical support. Consequently, REDD+ should be oriented towards direct
support of such local and regional initiatives rather than being limited to
payments for ‘reducing’ agricultural production.
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